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This paper outlines the many geopolitical downsides to arming the Kurds while
remaining agnostic to the domestic political benefits in the United States of being “tough” on the
Islamic State. While there are certainly security and geopolitical reasons to engage through proxy
with the Islamic State, domestic political pressure and a misunderstanding of who the Kurds
actually are could cause the United States to act against its interests. Arming Kurdish militias
like the People's Protection Units (YPG) is especially damaging to the United States’ relationship
with Turkey, but also it harms its relations with Iraq and the other parties involved in the Syrian
War. Furthermore, the long-term legacy of the recently botched Kurdish independence
referendum is still unclear, and Kurdish leadership appears unstable at the moment. The United
States should resuscitate its relationship with Turkey by discontinuing its armament of the YPG
while applying economic coercion to gain leverage over the increasingly despotic regime.
The Kurds are an anomaly in the Middle East. Numbering between 25 and 35 million
people, they occupy the mountainous areas containing parts of Turkey, Iran, Armenia, Iraq, and
Syria.1 In fact, they comprise the fourth-largest ethnic group in the Middle East, but—barring the
short-lived and Soviet-supported Kurdish Republic of Mahabad2—the Kurds have never secured
a stable state of their own. They have also experienced repeated political abuses within their
respective countries and from global powers, including the United States. In September 2017, the
Kurds made headlines when the United States’ Department of Defense, under President Donald
Trump and Secretary of Defense James Mattis, reportedly funneled “billions of dollars’ worth of
Soviet-era weaponry to anti-Islamic State groups in Syria, with questionable oversight.”3 These
groups include the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, or YPG, which is fighting against the
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Islamic State (IS) alongside the Syrian Democratic Forces. According to a September 2017
report spearheaded by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and the
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), the Pentagon provided $2.2 billion worth of
weaponry to such rebel groups.4
It is difficult to discern5 whether the Pentagon will continue to arm the YPG, however. At
the moment, there are a number of contradictory claims coming from Turkey, the White House,
and Secretary Mattis regarding any possible shift in the policy of arming the YPG. On November
24, 2017, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced in a news conference that
President Trump vowed to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that the United States
would cease arming the YPG.6 When questioned, Trump’s National Security Team appeared
taken aback by the announcement from Ankara and were uncertain how to respond.7 The State
Department referred questions to the White House, and several hours transpired without
confirmation from the National Security Council.8 A White House description of the call was
cryptic, mentioning only that Trump notified Erdoğan of “pending adjustments to the military
support provided to our partners on the ground in Syria.”9 Later, U.S. officials said they planned
for American troops to continue working with Kurdish soldiers in northern Syria, with Secretary
Mattis saying defiantly, “We’re not going to just walk away right now.”10 In short, whether the
United States will continue arming the YPG is uncertain, but a synthesis of the various
comments suggests that the United States might stop arming the YPG, though not right away.
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The lack of commitment to the Kurds in Washington, D.C., belies the fact that while the
White House is willing to work with Kurdish groups such as the YPG in the fight against the
Islamic State, this collaboration comes at a great political cost. Arming Kurdish nationalist
groups such as the YPG risks offending allies and non-allies alike in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey due
to the YPG’s association with the terrorist organization known as the The Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK). In Turkey, for instance, decades of conflict with the PKK have contributed to what
looks from the outside like a raving, irrational hatred of many Kurdish groups. This hatred is not
going away, however, and it must be taken seriously if the United States hopes to have Turkey as
an ally, despite the countless domestic transgressions of President Erdoğan and the ruling Justice
and Development Party (AKP).
Depictions of a monolithic Kurdish society are often flawed but useful from a rhetorical
perspective. For instance, the Turkish state broadly sees “the Kurds” and “the Kurdish question”
as a threat. Rational or not, this animus is hard to deny. Specifically, Turkey’s former Deputy
Prime Minister Beşir Atalay said in an interview that, throughout AKP rule since 2002, nearly 60
percent of all “reforms and democratization initiatives” undertaken were in relation to “the
Kurdish issue.”11 As the largest non-Turkish ethnic group in the country and, indeed, one of the
largest nations of people in the world without a sovereign state,12 the Kurds have experienced a
tempestuous relationship with the AKP and with Turkey. Furthermore, the Kurds “have been
regarded as a potential threat to ‘Turkishness’ and thus to the territorial integrity of the state” for
decades.13 Erdoğan has viewed their existence and their involvement in Parliament with
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increasing apprehension since 2012, which was the deadliest year in the conflict between Turkey
and the PKK since the arrest of PKK forerunner Abdullah Ocalan in 1999.14
In contrast, the American public, foreign policy elites, and media seem to view Kurdish
groups like the YPG favorably. Prominent online communities such as Imgur and Reddit lionize
the northern Iraqi Kurdish fighters known as the Peshmerga in popular posts entitled “Can we
get some love for the Peshmerga?”15 or “Meet Joanna Palani the Iranian-Kurdish YPG fighter
with a $1 Million bounty on her head.”16 Because the Kurds have become a sort of “American
darling” for their status as ISIS-busting underdogs,17 real deliberation concerning the “complex
promises and pitfalls” of Kurdish independence has been underdeveloped.18 Alongside popular
user-uploaded posts, legacy news organizations such as the New York Times publish articles like,
“A Dream of Secular Utopia in ISIS’ Backyard” or “To Save Iraq, Arm the Kurds.” The latter
article makes a startling claim: “Turkey should not be a problem. Although it is currently
fighting its own Kurdish population, it has close relations with the Iraqi Kurds.”19 While it is true
that Iraq’s Kurdish situation is different from the Kurdish independence movements in Turkey,
Syria, and Iran, this remark vastly underestimates the Turkish state’s hostility toward such
movements, while overestimating the potential for independence movements in Iraq to be
conducive to independence movements elsewhere. The fact that Iraq and Turkey trade with one
another is no guarantor of good rapport. American media and public opinion regarding “the
Kurds” consistently misunderstands the degree to which Turkey views Kurdish independence
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movements anywhere as a direct—if not existential—threat. Furthermore, the overt lionization of
Kurdish militias by American audiences could prompt actions that harm the United States’
relationship with Turkey and other countries in the region.
For years, Western public opinion has fancied the Kurds as both a model minority for
their emphasis on egalitarianism and as an unlikely player in international geopolitics. 20 Some of
this admiration is reasonable and hard-earned. Since multilateral air strikes began in September
2014, the Peshmerga (a word which means “one who confronts death”) have reclaimed twentyfive to thirty percent of territories lost to the Islamic State, effectively curbing ISIS’ access to
revenue streams such as oil or natural gas.21 According to a first-person account in The Atlantic,
the Kurds have proven to be a motivated and tactful fighting force:
The soldiers I spoke with acknowledge many reasons previous
U.S.-trained forces came up short. But this time is different, they
insist. Iraq, along with the Kurds in northern Iraq, presents a bit of
a perfect storm. They have new motivation and have shown it.
They spent 2016 fighting for their homeland, taking huge losses,
and keep fighting. They’re demonstrating advanced and improving
skills. And the United States has their back, significantly. ISIS is
on the run, on the battlefield.22
At times, the Kurds seem like the only viable militia with enough organization and motivation to
effectively fight ISIS without putting American boots on the ground. This has contributed to a
sort of mythos wherein the Kurdish people, their interests, their ideals, their intentions, and their
short-term successes are emphasized, while long-term military capabilities and the interests of
NATO allies are sidelined. Claims that the Kurds’ values and interests align with those of the
United States might have some moral or interpersonal insight, but they lack a real understanding
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of the dynamics of the contemporary Middle East and the criteria for a political order that lasts
after U.S. forces go home.
Recent Events in Iraqi Kurdistan
One clear takeaway from the past year is that “the Kurds” are not a monolithic entity of
principled do-gooders at odds with the chaos of the contemporary Middle East. Although some
of them fit that description, they are generally an alluring but dysfunctional group of fragmented
cultures with sometimes-untenable ideals caught in the same, complex calculus as other factions
in the region. There is certainly descriptive power in understanding how “the Kurds” are
perceived: For Turkey, they are inherently rebellious insurgents; for the United States, they are a
vaguely heroic entity with a somewhat common cause to the American agenda.23 The rest of this
article, however, assumes that any depiction of a monolithic Kurdistan has little prescriptive
relevance.
On a regional level, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) or Iraqi Kurdistan, has
grown emboldened in its petitions for land and independence in recent months and years. For
example, when Kurdish militias regained Sinjar from ISIS in 2015, the leader of Iraq’s Kurdish
region, Masoud Barzani, claimed that only the Kurdish flag would fly in the newly liberated
territory.24 Barzani’s statement was a bold attempt to secure some form of political independence
for Iraqi Kurdistan, but the government of Iraq militarily asserted that the area, with its lucrative
oil fields, must remain under federal control.25
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More recently, in September 2017, Barzani spearheaded an independence referendum in
Iraq. The vote was accompanied by “euphoric celebrations in the streets of Irbil and other
Kurdish cities,” but the realities of global geopolitics soon quashed the celebratory mood.26
Washington, Ankara, Tehran, and Baghdad all objected to the referendum, but Barzani and the
KRG believed that Iraq’s neighbors would be unwilling or unlikely to “muster sustained
sanctions or a blockade.”27 When the referendum occurred, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi
ordered his forces to recapture the city of Kirkuk from the Peshmerga.28 As sporadic fighting
broke out, many Peshmerga were ordered to stand down.29 In the end, the referendum backfired
spectacularly, both politically and as a personal PR mishap for Barzani. Pundits of all stripes
dubbed the event an “unmitigated disaster” for its miscalculation of American, Turkish, Iranian,
and especially Iraqi capacity and willingness to rally an adequate response.30 Perhaps the KRG
assumed that trade ties between the KRG and Turkey would soften any historical animosities and
limit the Turks’ resentment toward the referendum.31 In any case, Iraqi Kurdistan lay in political
disarray, and the sacrosanctity of territorial integrity proved, once again, to carry more weight in
global geopolitics than anticipated.
The Peshmerga and the Fight against IS
While viewing the Kurds solely as combatants against the Islamic State is unwise, the
Kurds have undoubtedly proven to be a “committed and pragmatic partner” in the fight against
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IS.32 The Kurdish Peshmerga have battled radical Islamist groups, and they have a history of
striking “politically expedient alliances to protect their interests and territory.”33 In other words,
the Kurds do have value in fighting against the Islamic State:
These alliances, alongside coalition airstrikes, have borne fruit.
Iraqi Kurds claim to have retaken about 10,500 miles of territory
from ISIS while providing sanctuary for nearly two million
refugees and internally displaced persons, 19 percent of whom are
Sunni Arabs. Diyala is now the only province in northern Iraq with
no ISIS presence. Kobani and about 100 surrounding Syrian
villages are also ISIS-free. These gains coincide with coordinated
Kurdish–Sunni Arab battles around Aleppo that have pushed ISIS
back to strongholds in Raqqa, Deir al-Zor, Al-Hasakah city, and
the surrounding countryside.34
Nevertheless, even the most optimistic observers note that Peshmerga forces’ “successes” have
profound negative externalities. For instance, coalition air strikes antagonize Sunni Arabs, the
support of whom the United States needs to repel the Islamic State and pursue lasting peace.35
The successes of the YPG are encouraging “transborder Kurdish nationalism,” which is a thorn
in the side of Turkish and Iranian claims to territorial integrity.36 Finally, Kurdish independence
movements’ fight against ISIS is fracturing the Kurds.37
Not only is a monolithic, unified Kurdistan a rhetorical mirage, but the Kurds’ allegiance
to the United States is also problematized by a complex history. While the Kurds have spent
decades cultivating an image as a “stable, private-sector friendly outpost in a region fraught by
sectarian turmoil,” this does not necessarily mean that they trust or view Washington favorably.38
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Although the KRG appears opportunistic, they know well the sting of empty promises from the
United States:
History is an issue too. Simply mention the year 1975 to any Kurd,
and, within moments, one will hear of U.S. Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger’s “betrayal”—the Algiers Agreement, which
temporarily ended the conflict between Iraq and Iran. The
agreement left the Iraqi Kurds, who had supported the Iranian
Shah, to suffer at the hands of the Baathists. The treachery is
seared into Kurdistan’s collective memory as a reminder of the
dangers of leaving oneself to the mercy of the established
powers.39
The Kurds have experienced more recent Western duplicity as well. Near the beginning of the
Iraq War, U.S. special forces and Peshmerga joined forces against the Ansar al-Islam
insurgency.40 The Kurds thought they had demonstrated their role as staunch allies of the United
States, but Paul Bremer, head of the coalition provisional government in Iraq, “sought to disarm
them.”41 After “sweeping” through Kirkuk in 2003, pressure from the United States prompted
the Kurds to pull back—an event the KRG authorities lamented for years before recapturing the
“revered” city in 2017.42
As with many foreign entanglements, history is a liability for the United States when
dealing with the Kurds. While interests align for the moment, those who anticipate an
enthusiastic Kurdish ally into the foreseeable future are likely to be disappointed. For this reason
and many others, viewing the Kurds solely in reference to the fight against the Islamic State is
problematic and short-sighted.
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Turkey and the Kurds: A Tumultuous Relationship
Turkey and its president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, have a tumultuous relationship with the
country’s Kurds, which make up 15 to 20 percent of the total population.43 Since Abdullah
Ocalan established the PKK in the 1970s to call for an independent Kurdish state, more than
40,000 people have been killed and hundreds of thousands displaced.44 Turkey considers the
YPG (whom the U.S. allegedly armed with Soviet-era weaponry) and the PYD (a Kurdish
opposition party in Syria) as extensions of the PKK. The YPG denies this, and the United States
appears to treat the YPG and the PKK as separate entities despite evidence to the contrary.
Meanwhile, the Turkish government seems to prioritize military actions against the PKK over
the Islamic State as the U.S. partners with the Kurds to fight ISIS.45 Suffice it to say, there is a
profound disconnect between the values of the United States and Turkey and their military
priorities.
From the viewpoint of the Turkish state, supporting or arming “the Kurds” is akin to
advocating for terrorism, working against Turkish national sovereignty, undermining
“Turkishness” and Ottoman imperial aspirations, and dismissing the interests of Erdoğan and the
AKP. In fact, Erdoğan explicitly stated this. When the United States ordered a munitions airdrop
to the Syrian city of Kobani, Erdoğan retorted with a brash accusation: “The U.S. did this in spite
of us. I told them the aid you’re sending is going to a terror group.”46 From the Turkish
perspective, the United States is choosing the support of a group of stateless, quasi-Marxist
rebels over an ally with one of the largest armies in NATO. Moral or not, the values and interests
“Who are the Kurds?”
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of the Turkish government prioritize military actions against the PKK as much as, if not more
than, the Islamic State.47 Again, Erdoğan quipped in a trip to Latvia, “To us, ISIS is the same as
PKK.”48 Although Western capitals were incensed at the quote, Erdoğan’s quote reflected the
popular opinion in Turkey, where 43.7 percent of Turks see the PKK as a greater threat to their
country than ISIS.49 From a purely realist perspective, the United States would do well to tap into
the interests of allies such as Turkey and use these as leverage rather than trying to morph them
through tacit coercion, passive aggression, and tone-deaf idealism.
Ottomanism and Erdoğanism
While some of Turkey’s hatred of the Kurds originates from real-world violence at the
hands of the PKK, some of it stems unilaterally from the shrewd political maneuvering of
President Erdoğan and the AKP. With the abandonment of peace talks between the Turkish
government and the ethnic Kurds, an eruption of conflict paralyzed much of the southern and
eastern quadrants of Turkey in 2015.50 The AKP and President Erdoğan, in particular, were at
odds with the Kurds politically—especially after the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party
(HDP) procured 10 percent of the seats in Turkey’s parliamentary elections in 2015, effectively
thwarting Erdoğan’s bid to expand the powers of the presidency at the time.51
In September 2015, after the AKP momentarily lost traction but before the November
elections in which it gained back its electorate, Foreign Policy cited increasingly divisive
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rhetoric and legal/military actions against the Kurds as a somewhat transparent attempt to
consolidate power and rally its nationalist base:
Rather than accepting the challenge of building a coalition
government in a polarized political climate, Erdoğan, it quickly
became clear, was more interested in forcing another election in
which a more favorable result would return his party to power
single-handedly. The voters had “made a mistake,” Erdoğan
declared, but the next round of voting would “correct the
problems” it created. Playing on long-standing fears that coalition
government would lead to chaos, Erdoğan told voters that only an
AKP majority could bring the country stability.52
Indeed, fighting between the PKK and the Turkish government intensified with “renewed fury”
in the weeks and months before the elections in November 2015:
The AKP is now hoping the resurgence of Turkey’s war on
Kurdish separatists will help woo back nationalist voters and that
renewed PKK violence will discredit the pro-Kurdish People’s
Democratic Party (HDP), whose success in June thwarted
Erdoğan’s ambitions. With violence spreading into cities and onto
the streets and the value of the Turkish lira falling, Erdoğan
continues to insist this all could have been avoided if the AKP had
achieved an appropriate majority in the last election.53
Of course, any speculation or assumption regarding the intentions of the AKP runs the risk of
oversimplification or, worse, spreading inaccuracies. Many signs, however, indicate that the
AKP systematically ramped up political rhetoric at the expense of liberalism and the rule of
law—a process that arguably continues today. In addition to the rampant human rights abuses in
cities such as Cizre in southern Turkey, it is worth noting that the Kurdish issue has been among
the AKP’s most successful instruments in the attempt to consolidate power and suppress dissent
over the past decade, with increased vigor in the past few years. By the same token, American
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support for Kurdish militias fuels anti-American sentiments not only among the upper echelons
of the AKP, but also among those affected by PKK violence in southern Turkey who are looking
for a strongman. The authoritarian drift in Turkey is phenomenally complex, although some of it
stems from the fact that a panicky electorate saw the world around it descending into chaos.
Meanwhile, the United States and NATO were not only unreliably absent during Turkey’s search
for security; they seemed to be arming the very people who posed the threat in the first place.
This provided avenues for Erdoğan and others to seize the reigns and fill the security vacuum
with newfound vigor—asserting himself and his party as the champions of order and security in
the country.
Much of this fear-laced zeal takes the form of an Ottoman idealism unique to Erdoğan’s
AKP. Many AKP supporters celebrate the cultural shift within Turkey’s government from
regarding the Ottoman empire as regressive and corrosive to something worthy of celebration
and continuation.54 Others note that such “jaundiced invocations of the Ottoman past” can blind
the AKP to the region’s willingness to be swept into the fold of “Erdoğanism” or
“Ottomanism.”55 The Kurds do not view the Ottoman period as favorably as the AKP, and they
are more willing to resist than the Turkish government presumes. Another feature of Erdoğanism
is a near-paranoia regarding outside influence in Turkish affairs, which spiked after the
attempted coup in July of 2016. Westerners, Kurds, secularists, journalists, and followers of the
Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen—these are the imposters against whom there is no defense but
Erdoğanism:
As far as Erdoğan’s right-wing and Islamist supporters are
concerned, the coup attempt was not only a domestic attack but
also a plot by scheming “foreign allies” to overthrow Erdoğan
through their Gulenist proxies. His supporters insist that it was
54
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simply the latest in a series of historical attacks the West has
launched against the Turkish nation and the umma, stretching back
to the Crusades. According to this line of thinking, by targeting
Erdoğan and the Turkish state simultaneously, these nefarious
foreign interests inextricably linked the future of the country to the
fate of the leader: without Erdoğan, Turkey cannot become a great
nation again or fulfill its historical mission of restoring the dignity
of the umma.56
Again, while observers in the West might call this a feature of the AKP paranoia, it is
undoubtedly a shrewd and effective political instrument. By arming “the Kurds,” the United
States risks further alienating and further destabilizing the Turkish regime, giving more fodder
for AKP authoritarianism, and prompting Turkey, a NATO ally, to balance against the United
States. Turkey is too important and the Kurds too fragile for the United States to risk disaffecting
a key player in its current geopolitical strategy.
The Trump Presidency and the Unknown Future of Turkey and the Kurds
Turkey’s willingness over the past several years to reach out to Russia and Iran—both
historical rivals— is worrisome because it suggests that Ankara has “given up on Washington.”57
After the 2016 election of U.S. President Donald Trump, however, Ankara hoped for a new era
in U.S.-Turkish relations.58 President Erdoğan congratulated Trump on his success and began to
exhibit anti-Iranian rhetoric to show a readiness to contain Iranian aggression in Syria and
beyond.59 He also hoped Washington would stop, or at least curtail, its support for the YPG,
which he and the Turkish government view as a direct wing of the PKK.60 Instead, the Trump
administration increased its support for the YPG, since it sees the YPG as the only militia in the
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region capable of fighting the Islamic State.61 In response, Ankara continued to turn to Moscow
for support—by purchasing Russia’s S-400 anti-aircraft missile system, for example— which
indicates increased foreign policy aggression and a deep frustration with both NATO and the
United States.62 Iran has taken note of this fact, and it has started vocalizing unprecedented antiKurdish rhetoric against the YPG.63 Indeed, much of the geopolitical positioning in Syria is in
opposition to the YPG, not the Islamic State. By siding with the YPG, the United States
government is arguably siding with the group most despised by all the state actors involved in
Syria.
The Trump administration presents uncertainties to all parties involved. President Trump
has quipped that he does not feel the same obligations toward existing U.S. policies and
relations, such as when he flip-flopped on whether he was bound to a “one China” policy in
December 2016.64 Non-state actors that aspire to independence hope this unorthodox posture
signals openness to recognizing new states. One article has pointed out that they are right to
hope, as Trump’s choice for Secretary of State at the time, former ExxonMobil CEO Rex
Tillerson,65 sent a message to Kurdish leaders: “Tillerson may not be an experienced diplomat,
but he is a friendly face to the Kurds, having overseen ExxonMobil’s expansion to Kurdistan in
2011.” The article continues, “Tillerson’s experiences as an oil mogul have been met with a mix
of concern and praise in Washington, but they are generally viewed as an advantage by the oil-
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rich Kurdistan Region of Iraq.”66 Indeed, oil may be a major factor in Tillerson’s appointment,
and the KRG relies on oil sales for 90 percent of its revenue.67 Among “oil executives and
seasoned Iraq analysts,” for instance, some have proposed that many Kurds, especially in Iraq,
can be motivated by the outlook of “oil revenues and budgetary guarantees” alone.68 The KRG
sends roughly three million barrels of oil to Ceyhan, Turkey, but it has met resistance when
selling globally.69 This is at least in part because of interventions from the Iraqi government. In
response, some have posited that if the United States helps facilitate and ease the way for KRG
oil trading, Kurdish militias would be more likely to support the United States in the battle
against the Islamic State.70
The Trump presidency has interesting effects on the Kurdish question. Broadly, President
Trump’s inexperience and ineptitude is viewed by those on the losing side of U.S. foreign policy
as a potential for positive gain. His complete lack of diplomatic protocol could provide “useful
gaffes” or helpful improvisations that serve Kurdish interests.71 This lack of tact was seen when
then-president-elect Trump received a complimentary phone call from the Taiwanese president,
much to the chagrin of the Chinese.72 A similar situation with the Kurds could create leverage or
elicit a reaction from Turkey to the Kurds’ benefit. While the Kurds might view the situation in
hopeful expectation, the actual effects of the Trump presidency on the United States’ relationship
with Turkey is yet to be known. If Trump’s bombastic rhetoric regarding the fight against the
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Islamic State is any guide to his foreign policy priorities, it might not bode well for the United
States’ relationship with Turkey.

Policy Recommendations
Economic coercion and incentives aimed at the AKP are certainly a risky and direct
method, but these might be among the few languages to which the AKP elite will listen
attentively. President Erdoğan has proven that he does not receive verbal criticism well, but
Turkey’s geopolitical goals require him to pay attention to energy policy and security.73 Turkey
is situated between the world’s largest consumers and producers of energy and, like Russian
President Vladimir Putin, Erdoğan’s mass appeal is, in part, predicated on his ability to maintain
the flow of energy through Turkey.74 In quiet moments, Turkey aspires to be the “energy hub” of
the region, specifically in the transfer of natural gas from Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan to Europe.75
Disregarding the irony of Turkey’s apparent desire to trade with Iraqi Kurdistan, this ambition
presents a genuine opportunity for the United States. In this turbulent moment for energy
security in Turkey and the world, the United States is in a position to use this concern as
leverage. For example, the conflict with the PKK in Southeastern Turkey threatens the transfer of
oil from Iraqi Kurdistan, through Turkey, and into Europe.76 In addition, the PKK is known to
sabotage natural gas pipelines in the region, such as the Kirkuk-Ceyhan natural gas pipeline, the
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Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline, and the
Turkey-Iran natural gas pipeline.77
A worthwhile counterpoint to those hoping to rekindle ties with Turkey is that the policy
of placating Erdoğan is actually a sort of appeasement. How can the United States pursue its
interests in the region with Turkey’s support and without writing a blank check to the “New
Sultan?” In response, many foreign policy experts? are calling for a more assertive response to
Erdoğan’s provocations: “If Erdoğan knows that he needs the United States, the thinking goes,
Washington can take a tougher line with him and secure more cooperative behavior.”78 This is a
salient point. The pursuit of an “assertive” response, however, should not translate into arming
the YPG. Rather, it should mean working through diplomacy, economic coercion and incentives,
removing the barriers to cooperation, soft power, and other methods.
From the position of the United States, Turkey’s energy interests represent a remarkable
opportunity to relieve Turkey of the burden of energy insecurity by facilitating exports from Iraqi
Kurdistan. First, the United States can broker deals with the Kurds in Iraq and provide protection
to natural gas pipelines threatened by the PKK. Then, by strategically leveraging interests in the
region, the United States can help lift the burden of energy insecurity in exchange for key shifts
in AKP policy in Syria, toward the Islamic State, regarding the refugee crisis, or even domestic
reform. For example, the U.S. could offer air defense, intelligence, or UAV support to protect
pipelines in southeastern Turkey, which would be a service to both the KRG and the Turkish
government with the added political benefit of being tough on the PKK. Third, the United States
could “quietly drop its objections to Kurdish independent oil sales” in Iraq and help secure safe
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passage of KRG oil tankers in international waters.79 In any event, strengthening Iraqi Kurdistan
economically is more sensible than arming the YPG. If an independent Kurdistan were to be
established anywhere, it would make the most sense for it to be in Iraqi Kurdistan because of the
stability it could provide Iraq and the nature of the KRG. Furthermore, overseeing increased
trade between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan provides an avenue to support certain Kurdish militias
that provide a buffer against the Islamic State without appearing sympathetic to either the PKK
or the YPG. If an independent Kurdistan lies in the distant future, it should emerge and sustain
itself with minimal U.S. ties and obligations. Increased trade would not only strengthen
economic ties between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan, provide an independent revenue stream for
the KRG, bolster a functioning Kurdish civil society, and help fund those fighting the Islamic
State through increased trade revenue, but also it could lessen Turkey’s reliance on Russian oil
and Iranian natural gas. Increased trade would serve as a timely reminder to Turkey of its desire
and need for the patronage of the United States. This relationship is sweetened for the KRG by
the prospect of selling more gas in Turkey, which, because of a lack of both transportation and
storage, costs double the European price.80 In economic terms, Turkey is a “premium market”
when it comes to gas exports.81 Everybody wants to sell to Turkey, and the United States has the
opportunity to broker a solution while gaining important concessions from the AKP. All parties
can save face, and the United States can increase its prestige in the region with minimal
monetary or military investment.
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Of course, the logistical triangulation of this recommendation alone is significant, and the
status of Iraqi Kurdistan after the botched referendum is still unknown. It requires many parties
to coordinate across a number of cultural and political barriers, and the Trump administration’s
apparent distaste for diplomatic procedure certainly does not help matters. However, with United
States’ diplomatic resources and economic leadership, it is far more realistic and has a clearer
definition of success than a number of other available political options that center on arming
non-state actors to fight other non-state actors.
The first step in achieving this goal is to rebut the damaging narrative that the United
States is actively arming Turkey’s enemies. Turkey has sided with countries such as Russia and
Iran in recent years to balance against the United States. While Turkey has failed to bandwagon
with these countries with much enthusiasm, it does so in part because of America’s perceived
closeness to the Kurds. This poses a problem since, as The Atlantic astutely noted, “There is no
path to victory over ISIS without Erdogan.”82 Turkey is an important national security ally, a
NATO partner, the host country for 70 to 80 U.S. nuclear weapons at Incirlik Air Force Base,
and a necessary player in the global refugee crisis. For this reason and many others, few in the
U.S. government are itching to lose Turkey’s friendship entirely:
The historic weight of Turkey’s alliance with the United States, its
regional influence, and its capacity to derail other U.S. interests
have led officials to conclude that, one way or another, the bilateral
relationship must remain functional. Like that of former President
Barack Obama, the administration of Donald Trump has therefore
sought other means to placate Turkish anger over the United
States’ ongoing support for Kurdish forces in Syria. In addition to
offering intelligence about PKK targets outside of Syria, the
administration has muted its criticism of Turkey’s democratic
decline and continues to offer Erdoğan public meetings with the
U.S. president.83
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If American national security interests were the only consideration—discounting ideals or
abstract notions of human rights or political pressures to defeat the Islamic State—the verdict
would be clear: The United States should stop supporting Kurdish forces like the YPG and
instead focus on its relationship with Turkey. Turkey has far more to offer the United States, and
its military capabilities are far greater than the YPG or any other Kurdish group. Turkey is too
important to disregard, and its relationship with the United States is not yet beyond repair in the
long term.
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